The rise of China and its fellow BRICS countries Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa challenge the post 1945 American led world order. The rising powers question the privileged position of Western countries and demand a greater share of authority (Dunne, 2020, p. 113). In the context of the relative decline of US hegemony, this has sparked multiple discussions about the future of the ‘liberal international order’ (LIO). This post addresses the question to what extent the rise of China undermines the LIO by analyzing the Chinese effect on two key internationalist principles. These encompass economic openness as well as international institutions (Ikenberry, 2009, p. 71). Further, it will be assessed which school of thought of International Relations can best explain the Chinese impact on the LIO.

Before engaging with the detailed analysis, a theoretical background briefly develops a common understanding of the LIO and presents the main ideas of the two theories. The latter will be applied to the analysis of the Chinese impact on economic openness and international institutions. Multiple examples are discussed to allow for a substantive conclusion in the final part of this work.

Theoretical Background

Regarding the theoretical background, it needs to be pointed out that there is no single definition of ‘the’ liberal international order. However, it can be described by the terms that are often associated with it. For example, economic openness, international institutions, rule of law, democracy and collective action are seen as main characteristics of the LIO (Ikenberry, 2009, p. 71). According to the literature, economic openness includes liberalization and free trade whereas international institutions describe persistent and interdependent sets of rules that shape behaviors. These may be represented in international regimes, which provide implicit or explicit principles, norms and decision-making procedures. They may also be formally institutionalized in international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Rittberger et al., 2019, p. 3). Considering the theoretical perspectives chosen for this analysis, two opposing characteristics are focused upon. On the one hand, there is the question whether states prefer absolute or relative gains. In a liberal internationalist view, states are willing to cooperate and assume a positive-sum game. Through cooperation all participating actors will profit and it does not matter whether some have greater benefits than others (Roberts et al., 2019, p. 659). Realists contest this assumption and argue that states prefer relative gains in a state of anarchy (Keohane, 1998). Consequently, in a realist zero-sum scenario, the balance of power is prioritized which implies that it is not sufficient to have a substantial amount of power but it is crucial to have more power than others (Mearsheimer, 2017, p. 52). On the other hand, liberal internationalist and realist views diverge with respect to dependencies. The former trust interdependent economic and security regimes based on norms and values which provide peace, stability and prosperity (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 21). The latter prioritize independence to protect state sovereignty and national interests. Realists believe that a state cannot rely on others to guarantee its survival but needs to follow the principle of self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2020, pp. 111–112).

Analysis

Having introduced the essential elements for the analysis, firstly, the Chinese impact on the principle of economic openness will be assessed. Ever since China joined the WTO in 2001, the country has fundamentally changed the international economic landscape by for instance transforming from a low-cost producer to one of the leading economies in technology development (World Politics Review, 2020). However, the initial euphoria about China’s accession to the WTO soon turned into frustrations. Weakened by the increased heterogeneity and the relative decline of Western economies, the WTO is also in a deadlock because China maintains its economic system of state capitalism which hinders fair competition (Mavroidis & Sapir, 2019, pp. 3–5). This can arguably be seen as one of the multiple reasons for the escalation in US-China trade relations which have eventually turned into a trade war (Zhang, 2018, pp. 55–57). Explaining these developments, a liberal internationalist perspective helps us to understand the euphoria when China joined the WTO. Steps to open the Chinese market provided economic opportunities for domestic as well as international economic actors such as multinational corporations and private investors who rendered absolute economic gains. The increased interdependence allowed for rule-based trade, stability and prosperity. However, liberal internationalism fails to explain why this situation has changed. At this point, a realist rationale highlights the geoeconomic logic claiming that a hegemon typically supports free trade when it does not fear the economic growth of its strategic rivals (Roberts et al., 2019, p. 659). In this case, the United States have been strong proponents of free trade in the post 1945 world order. The rise of China and fellow developing countries is substantially threatening American hegemony and undermines the LIO which explains why the Trump Administration has started to weaponize trade. The United States no longer tolerate asymmetrical absolute gains and worry about the balance of power. Economically, it arguably also applies the principle of self-help and aims to gain independence from globalized markets by following a mercantilist strategy to strengthen national sovereignty (Hendricks, 2018).

Secondly, the Chinese impact on international institutions, and in particular international organizations (IOs), will be explored. In general, it can be witnessed that China has become more active in the traditional IOs of the LIO. For example, UN Peacekeeping Operations have seen a twenty-fold increase in China’s troop deployment since 2000 which eventually added up to more troops than the total of the fellow permanent members of the UN Security Council (Hudda, 2015). In addition, the BRICS have gained greater political weight in the WTO (Narlikar, 2019, p. 24). Apart from this, there have also been adjustments in existing IOs. The World Bank changed its voting power distribution to provide emerging economies with greater influence which actually benefitted China the most (Leech, 2017; Wroughton, 2010). If the institutional changes are not convincing rising powers, they tend to set up their own institutions which could be witnessed in the case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Stephen, 2017, pp. 494–495; Strand & Trevathan, 2016). In other words, rising powers either become members of or adjust existing IOs or create their own. Scrutinizing these developments out of a liberal internationalist perspective, it may be pointed out that China is not undermining international institutions per se. On the contrary, by sending UN troops China cooperates within the international community to provide public goods such as peace and security. Similarly, China is also involved in security cooperation with the European Union which entails counterterrorism initiatives as well as building a common response to climate change (Kirchner et al., p. 2). The fact that existing IOs like the World Bank are adjusted to changing demands can be considered as an example of liberal internationalists’ ability to explain reform and change. Woodrow Wilson’s claim that the international society is ‘corrigible’ can be applied here. It shows that reforms are possible without losing complete stability in the existing system. If the participants strive for mutual gains, adjustments to structures and norms can be made in a peaceful manner (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 11). The latter aspect is also applicable to the creation of new IOs. Although the buildup of similar structures can be perceived in a competing sense and may question the general cooperative approach of liberal internationalism, new IOs are still international institutions and remain part of the LIO. Out of a realist perspective, international institutions have limited influence on state behavior. The realist rationale consists of a state-centric view and prioritizes the balance of power (Hyde-Price, 2006, pp. 218–219). Consequently, the increased Chinese involvement in IOs can be explained by its national interest to expand its power position. The increase in Chinese voting shares in the World Bank serves as a valid example and also shows that China acts in its own interest and not necessarily for a broader alliance of developing countries because the voting power of the BRICS member South Africa actually decreased (Wroughton, 2010). Whereas the enlarged number of troops in UN Peacekeeping Operations may not be the most obvious and efficient way of challenging the power balance, it still has an effect. Acknowledging the lack of attention paid to the UN by the United States (Nakasone & Schake, 2020), an enlarged contribution does not only have an absolute but an even bigger relative effect on the balance of power.

Conclusion

In summary, in this post I elaborated upon the question to what extent the rise of China undermines the LIO. Liberal internationalist and realist views were employed to analyze how the key internationalist principles of economic openness and international institutions are affected. Regarding the former, it may be stated that liberal internationalism fails to explain the impact of rising powers on economic openness while realists refer to a geoeconomic logic to describe how they undermine the LIO. With respect to the latter, liberal internationalist can explain why international institutions are used, adjusted or newly created but overall maintain their presence in the challenged LIO. However, realists offer valid arguments that international institutions are solely used in the national interest and as a playing field to change the global balance of power.

In my opinion, the realist rationale has greater explanatory power to make sense of the Chinese rise undermining the international principle of economic openness and taking advantage of international institutions to serve its national interest.

Thank you for investing your time in reading this post. If you have feedback, questions or concerns, feel free to reach out to me on twitter.

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_Cover photo retrieved from https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/increasing-multipolarity-dragging-world-chaos_

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