The term ‘strategic autonomy’ is widely used in current discussions about the future of the European Union (EU). It is prominently used by EU officials such as the HR/VP Borrell who sees it as a process of survival. Being for a long time reduced to security and defense, he widened the scope of strategic autonomy by also considering economic, technological and scientific dimensions (Borrell, 2020). Acknowledging the variety of policy areas in which the EU is turning towards more geopolitical positions, the developments in the more traditional field of security and defense may not be neglected. Commission President von der Leyen proposed the establishment of a genuine European Defense Union and intends to support this financially by providing funds to support research and capability development as well as to provide opportunities for the defense industries (Leyen, 2019, p. 19). Institutionally, this shift is accompanied by the creation of a new Commission Directorate General for Defense Industry and Space (European Parliament, 2020, p. 9). This post focuses on explaining this shift towards a more geopolitical security and defense strategy by employing different theoretical lenses. They encompass realist, liberal, and critical views. Liberal approaches focus on two theories of European integration, namely liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. Historical materialism as well as feminism are used as sources for the critical views.

Realist Perspectives

Firstly, a realist perspective essentially focuses on the principles of statism, survival and self-help and generally emphasizes the importance of hard (military) power. In the condition of anarchy, states follow their national interest of survival and strive to expand their power to gain as much sovereignty as possible (Dunne & Schmidt, 2020, p. 113; Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 218). The balance of power is a key feature of realist thought (Mearsheimer, 2017, p. 52). The latter also has explanatory power in the EU’s geopolitical shift. Assuming that the EU acts like a nation state, it is faced by a changing global balance of power. The traditional alliance with the United States has been weakened while rising powers, in particular China, challenge the liberal international order. Consequently, realists would highlight that the EU can no longer rely on others to guarantee its survival and needs to follow the principle of self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2020, pp. 111–112). Considering that the EU does not have its own army and military cooperation among member states is still in the development stage, a geopolitical shift is needed to close gaps in military power. For example, the European defense fund as well as the permanent structured cooperation are initiatives to achieve a pragmatic strategic autonomy. Apart from the global balance of power perspective, realists would also point out that the EU has a ‘national’ interest in stabilizing its neighborhood. Acknowledging that EU diplomacy has not been able to play a significant role in the conflicts in Syria, Libya or Nagorno-Karabakh, realists would conclude that increased military capabilities are needed to project power and to conduct a more coercive diplomacy (Borrell, 2020; George, 2018; Hyde-Price, 2006, pp. 230–231).

Liberal Perspectives

Secondly, to elaborate upon different liberal perspectives, this post concentrates on theories of European integration to explain the shift. On the one hand, liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on the role of member states that act rationally and follow their political and economic interests. They yield sovereignty from a national to a supranational level to eventually gain sovereignty by surrendering it (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009). On the other hand, neo-functionalism mainly argues that functional, bureaucratic or cultivated spillovers lead to further integration in new policy fields (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009). In this process, loyalties and expectations of political actors redirected (Haas, 1958). Regarding the shift towards a more geopolitical strategy in EU security and defense, liberal integrationist scholars would perceive this as a further integration step. Liberal intergovernmentalists would highlight the ambition of French President Macron to establish strategic autonomy. He argues that it was crucial to build up capacities in case NATO would be further weakened as an institution and the United States would withdraw its support (Burchard et al., 2020). Being the strongest military actor in the EU, France arguably wants other member states to share the responsibility and the subsequent costs of traditional defense (Franke, 2020). Apart from this, the current multiple national military structures are inefficient and ineffective (Bond, 2020). Therefore, it is also rational for national leaders to support further integration steps in the field of security and defense. The rhetoric about strategic autonomy may serve as part of the justification. With respect to neo-functionalism, the further shaping of a single market for defense shows the link between the existing economic competencies of the European Union and the potential expansion within the sphere of security and defense (European Commission, 2020). This can be seen as an example of a functional spillover, which is arguably complemented by bureaucratic dimension because of the establishment of a Directorate General for Defense Industry and Space (European Parliament, 2020, p. 9). The increased promotion of further cooperation in security and defense including rhetoric using terms like ‘geopolitical Commission’ and ‘political process of survival’ by representatives of EU institutions may be seen as proof of a cultivated spillover (Borrell, 2020; European Parliament, 2020).

Critical Perspectives

Thirdly, this post considers critical historical materialist and feminist approaches to inquire the geopolitical shift of the EU in security and defense matters. Applying a neo-Gramscian historical materialist rationale, the transnational defense-industrial class becomes the center of attention. The traditional state-centric analysis is criticized for neglecting the economic interests of private actors (Kurc & Oktay, 2018, pp. 483–484). Historical materialists emphasize the influence of the politico- economic hegemony of the ruling class and contest the realist assumption of political autonomy of a state. With regard to the EU, establishing military capabilities can be perceived as a tool to maintain or even expand the hegemonic position of the European arms industry and of European capitalism as a whole (Oikonomou, 2012, pp. 183–184). It has been shown that arms companies influence the definition of security and defense policies substantially and that military lobbies promote military reponses to security challenges (Calvo Rufanges, 2015). Therefore, historical materialists would argue that the military-industrial complex in the EU has pushed for the geopolitical shift. In addition, analytical feminism contributes valuable criticism to traditional theoretical frameworks by revealing gender bias. Providing gender-sensitive lens, feminist scholars reveal gendered dichotomies, for instance between ‘masculine’ hard power and ‘feminine’ soft power. Furthermore, the concept of human security is used instead of state security (True, 2013). Addressing the European Union, feminist scholars consider the EU as a masculine military power that is shaped by a protector masculinity. A crisis narrative is used to justify further militarization and the normalization of the financing and use of military capabilities. The crisis narrative presents the EU as a vulnerable entity threatened by a variety of threats such as terrorism. This provides justification for the establishment of the EU as a masculine protector against an aggressive ‘other’. Consequently, feminists would point out that the geopolitical shift and the subsequent militarization are the result of the crisis narrative that creates the need for the EU as a strong masculine protector (Hoijtink & Muehlenhoff, 2019, pp. 368–373).

Conclusion

Focusing on the security and defense dimension of the geopolitical shift of the European Union, different theoretical approaches and their explanation for these developments were presented. Firstly, realist principles of sovereignty and self-help provide an answer to the question why the EU intends to gain strategic autonomy. In the context of the changing global balance of power embodied by the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States, a geopolitical shift seems plausible. Secondly, the presented liberal views consider the shift as another step in the European integration process. This may not be false but has limited explanatory power because it is not clearly reflected in the specific rhetoric. Thirdly, historic materialist and feminist approaches provide valuable criticism with regard to the role of the military-industrial complex and the use of a crisis narrative justifying further militarization.

In my view, realist perspectives offer not only the most comprehensive explanatory power but also shape the thinking of EU officials such as the EU HR/VP Borrell who frequently speaks the ‘language of power’ (Borrell, 2019). However, critical approaches play an important role in questioning the current dominance of the realist geopolitical strategy in the EU’s security and defense.

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References

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